EXHIBIT 50

Redacted Excerpts from the First Deposition of Dr. Andrew Zimbalist

Page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA

- - - - - - - - X

Cung Le, Nathan Quarry, John Fitch
Brandon Vera, Luis Javier Vazquez,
and Kyle Kingsbury on behalf of
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Case No.

Plaintiffs, 2:15-cv-01045-RFB(PAL)

V.

Zuffa, LLC, d/b/a Ultimate,
Fighting Campionship and UFC,

Defendants.

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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF

ANDREW ZIMBALIST, Ph.D.

Northampton, Massachusetts

Magna Legal Services Reported By:

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Www.MagnaLS.com Job No: 345726



	Page 34		Page 36
1		1	individual parts, of the package, correct? 09:28:49
1 2	\mathcal{E} , \mathcal{I}	1 2	A. That's correct. 09:28:51
3	based upon the overall impact of a panoply 09:26:42 of restrictive clauses. 09:26:48	3	Q. And your damage estimate 09:28:52
4	I did identify one such clause 09:26:50	4	doesn't would not let me start over. 09:28:56
5	that appears in some contracts, which is 09:26:52	5	Your damage estimate does not 09:29:00
6	known as the options clause, which does not 09:26:54	6	include any method by which you could break 09:29:04
7	seem to be listed. 09:26:56	7	down the individual pieces of the package 09:29:07
8	Q. Okay. Let me add in the options 09:26:57	8	of exclusionary contracts and behavior such 09:29:09
9	clause. 09:27:00	9	that you could estimate damages from any 09:29:15
10	You've identified a package, or a 09:27:02	10	part of that package, correct? 09:29:17
11	panoply, of exclusionary contracts and 09:27:07	11	A. Not unless I was able to perform 09:29:20
12	behavior that flows from that on the basis 09:27:08	12	natural experiments. I can't with my 09:29:22
13	of which you have estimated damages. 09:27:11	13	existing data and existing methodology, 09:29:25
14	You've done that by listing paragraphs of 09:27:13	14	that's correct. 09:29:28
15	the complaint and also referencing the 09:27:15	15	Q. And the same is true whether 09:29:29
16	options clause. 09:27:18	16	you're talking about individual pieces or 09:29:35
17	Is there any other contract 09:27:18	17	subsets of the package; is that correct? 09:29:38
18	provision or behavior that you would point 09:27:21	18	And by that, I mean if you were 09:29:41
19	to as material to your damages estimate 09:27:24	19	to break down the exclusionary contracts 09:29:43
20	that you have not listed? 09:27:26	20	and behavior that you've relied on into 09:29:46
21	A. All right. As I sit here today, 09:27:28	21	subsets, you would not be able to estimate 09:29:49
22	I don't think there is. And as I repeat my 09:27:31	22	damages from the methods you've used from 09:29:52
23	previous answer, probably not. 09:27:34	23	those individual subsets? 09:29:55
24	Q. And if there is conduct that is 09:27:37	24	MR. CRAMER: Let me just object, 09:29:56
25	not part of that package of exclusionary 09:27:39	25	because I think it's a little 09:29:58
	Page 35		Page 37
1	contract provisions and behavior that you 09:27:44	1	misleading when you said "behavior 09:29:59
2	have described for me, you have not 09:27:46	2	you relied upon," because 09:30:02
3	estimated damages from such conduct; is 09:27:48	3	Professor Zimbalist was clear to say 09:30:05
4	that correct? 09:27:55	4	behavior he relied upon that flowed 09:30:06
5	MR. CRAMER: Asked and answered. 09:27:55	5	from the contract. 09:30:09
6	A. I believe that I have answered 09:27:56	6	MR. ISAACSON: And I'm using that 09:30:11
7	that very question. 09:27:58	7	as a shorthand for that, if I may. 09:30:12
8	Q. I don't think you did, and I'd 09:27:59	8	A. I'll agree with your statement. 09:30:15
9	ask you to answer it. 09:28:00	9	Q. Now, does your report provide, or 09:30:22
10	If there is conduct that's not 09:28:02	10	the methods you use, provide you to give 09:30:25
11	part of the package of exclusionary 09:28:03	11	you the ability to estimate the damages for 09:30:33
12	contract provisions and behavior that flows 09:28:06	12	any individual class member in this case? 09:30:35
13	from that that you've described for me, you 09:28:08	13	A. Indirectly, it does. Not 09:30:38
14 15	have not estimated damages from such 09:28:11 conduct; is that correct? 09:28:14	14 15	directly. 09:30:51 Q. Would you explain to me what you 09:30:51
16	A. Exclusionary contract provisions 09:28:16	16	Q. Would you explain to me what you 09:30:51 mean by that indirect method? 09:30:53
17	and behavior that flows from that? 09:28:18	17	A. I think that if the Plaintiffs 09:30:56
18	Q. Correct. 09:28:20	18	win this case and if there is a damages 09:30:59
19	A. That I have not that's 09:28:21	19	amount that's awarded, that the fighters 09:31:01
20	correct, yes. 09:28:21	20	could use that, along with some algorithm 09:31:06
21	Q. Now, you're referring to that 09:28:33	21	they decided upon, like the number of 09:31:10
22	package with a panoply of contract 09:28:37	22	fights that they were in or the aggregate 09:31:12
23	provisions and behavior that flows from it. 09:28:38	23	attendance at the fights that they were in, 09:31:16
24	You have not broken down that package to 09:28:41	24	to divide up the total damages amongst the 09:31:18
25	estimated damages from any parts, 09:28:45	25	fighters. 09:31:21

	Page 38		Page 40
1	Q. All right. And when you say if 09:31:22	1	Q. (b), it says, "Acquiring multiple 09:41:37
2	they win this case, they could use an 09:31:30	2	actual or potential rival MMA promotion 09:41:41
3	algorithm they decided upon, what do you 09:31:35	3	companies." 09:41:45
4	mean by "they decided upon"? 09:31:38	4	You did not estimate damages 09:41:45
5	A. I think what I'm saying is that 09:31:42	5	flowing from that item (b) of the 09:41:48
6	there were over the class period 1,172 09:31:47	6	challenged conduct, correct? 09:41:50
7	fighters who were who suffered damages 09:31:50	7	A. Correct. 09:41:51
8	because of the restrictive contracts, 09:31:57	8	Q. "(c) impairing other MMA 09:41:52
9	exclusionary contracts. And that they 09:32:01	9	promoters by using its alleged dominance to 09:41:56
10	could decide amongst themselves of the 09:32:04	10	threaten sponsors, promoters, and fighters 09:42:00
10	could decide amongst themserves of the 07.32.04	11	who worked with or considered working with 09:42:03
12	tripled, so whatever that number was, they 09:32:12	12	the UFC's potential rivals." 09:42:05
13	could decide what would be a fair way to 09:32:15	13	Did your estimate of damages 09:42:07
14	distribute that bounty amongst them. 09:32:18	14	include some or all of the conduct in item 09:42:10
15	Q. So I understand that your opinion 09:32:24	15	(c)? 09:42:13
16	` 1	16	A. Yes. 09:42:13
17	,	17	
18	7 66 6 6	18	Q. Well, that was an either/or. Is 09:42:13
	amount. Does your calculation of damages 09:32:32	19	it some or all? 09:42:18 A. Oh. 09:42:18
19	actually calculate an individual damages 09:32:36 amount? 09:32:40	20	
20 21		21	Q. Because you've listed 09:42:19
22	A. No. 09:32:40	22	"threatening sponsors, threatening 09:42:22
	Q. Does it actually your damages 09:32:40		promoters, and threatening fighters." 09:42:24
23	estimate, am I correct, does not estimate 09:32:43	23	A. Right. But are you saying all 09:42:27
24 25	the individual injury of any class member? 09:32:45	24	generically to those categories, or are you 09:42:30
25	A. That's correct. 09:32:49	25	saying every single threat that they made 09:42:32
	Page 39		Page 41
1	THE WITNESS: Can I have a break? 09:32:55	1	was 09:42:35
2	VIDEO TECHNICIAN: We're off the 09:32:58	2	Q. I mean the categories. 09:42:35
3	record at 9:32. 09:33:02	3	A. The categories, yes. 09:42:36
4	(Proceedings recessed at 09:33:04	4	Q. And returning to (a), when you 09:42:45
5	9:32 a.m., and reconvened at 9:40 09:33:04	5	refer to "entering multi-fight exclusive 09:42:48
6	a.m.) 09:39:30	6	contracts with a large share of the top 09:42:51
7	VIDEO TECHNICIAN: We're back on 09:40:00	7	Professional MMA Fighters," what do you 09:42:53
8	the record at 9:40 a.m. 09:40:31	8	mean by "a large share"? 09:42:55
9	BY MR. ISAACSON: 09:40:35	9	A. If you're looking for a 09:42:57
10	Q. Professor, if I could ask you to 09:40:36	10	percentage, I'm not going to give it to 09:43:00
11	return to Paragraph 1 of your report. 09:40:47	11	you, because I don't have one. 09:43:02
12	A. Okay. 09:41:03	12	Q. Can you give me a range? 09:43:03
13	Q. And I want to make sure I've 09:41:03	13	A. Well, today they're somewhere in 09:43:05
14	understood your testimony correctly in 09:41:06	14	the neighborhood of 90 percent; that that's 09:43:08
15	light of the last sentence of Paragraph 1: 09:41:08	15	a number that's a share that's been growing 09:43:13
16	"The challenged conduct includes, among 09:41:13	16	over time. But I think certainly for the 09:43:15
17	other things: (a) entering multi-fight 09:41:15	17	entire class period, they had a dominant 09:43:17
18	exclusive contracts with a large share of 09:41:19	18	share of the fighters. They had a strong 09:43:21
19	the top Professional MMA Fighters thereby 09:41:22	19	majority share of the top fighters. 09:43:22
20	keeping this allegedly necessary input from 09:41:25	20	Q. And how do you define "the top 09:43:25
21	other MMA promotions." 09:41:27	21	fighters"? 09:43:28
22	Little (a) of that sentence, that 09:41:30	22	A. Well, there are metrics that are 09:43:29
23	was part of your damages calculation, 09:41:33	23	out there that identify the top 15 fighters 09:43:38
24	correct? 09:41:35	24	in each weight class, and I remember going 09:43:40
25	Δ Ves 00.41.36	25	through that at some point early on And I 00:43:43



	Page 42		Page 44
1	don't remember exactly how it came out, but 09:43:48	1	"market." I was not asked to do 09:46:35
2	Zuffa in, say, two years ago had at least 09:43:51	2	cross elasticity of demand or snip tests. 09:46:39
3	90 percent of the top 15 fighters in the 09:43:56	3	I've done no formal analysis of market 09:46:43
4	weight classes that I looked at. So it was 09:43:59	4	power here. 09:46:48
5	somewhere along those lines. 09:44:02	5	And so I'm when I say 09:46:49
6	Obviously, prior to the 09:44:03	6	"anticompetitive in character," I mean if a 09:46:54
7	acquisition of Strikeforce in 2011, they 09:44:05	7	company that had market power engaged in 09:46:57
8	had somewhat of a lower share, but it was 09:44:08	8	this behavior, would it have 09:47:00
9	always a dominant share, at least in the 09:44:10	9	anticompetitive effects. 09:47:04
10	class period. 09:44:15	10	Q. All right. And does your report 09:47:15
11	Q. When you're referring to metrics 09:44:15	11	do any analysis of the extent of the 09:47:17
12	that identify top fighters, are you 09:44:17	12	anticompetitive effects from the challenged 09:47:21
13	referring to published rankings? 09:44:19	13	conduct assuming that Zuffa had market 09:47:26
14	A. Yes. 09:44:21	14	power? 09:47:29
15	Q. And your report does not do any 09:44:24	15	A. Does it do any analysis? Say 09:47:29
16	actual work on identify who are the top 09:44:25	16	that again? 09:47:32
17	fighters and who are not? 09:44:28	17	Q. Of the extent of the 09:47:34
18	A. That's correct. 09:44:30	18	anticompetitive effect. 09:47:36
19	Q. And when you say "a large share," 09:44:32	19	MR. CRAMER: Other than the 09:47:37
20	do you count that large share by the number 09:44:37	20	damages analysis? Or are you 09:47:38
21	of fighters, that is by counting the 09:44:39	21	including that? 09:47:40
22	individuals? 90 percent would be nine out 09:44:43	22	Q. Well, is there an analysis of an 09:47:41
23	of ten of the individual fighters? 09:44:45	23	anticompetitive effect in your report other 09:47:51
24	A. As opposed to weighting them by 09:44:47	24	than the damages analysis? 09:47:54
25	the 09:44:49	25	A. So I'm not clear what you're 09:48:02
	Page 43		Page 45
1	Q. Weighting by anything. 09:44:50	1	driving at. I have a discussion and 09:48:03
2	A. Yes. I'm talking about a 09:44:51	2	analysis of how the individual exclusionary 09:48:06
3	straight headcount. 09:44:53	3	clauses impact the market and how it 09:48:12
4	Q. Now, I asked one more 09:44:55	4	forecloses the market. And then on the 09:48:15
5	assumption I want to check on. Are you 09:45:22	5	basis of that, I do an empirical damage 09:48:20
6	assuming that the challenged conduct as a 09:45:23	6	estimate. 09:48:23
7	whole is in violation of the antitrust 09:45:25	7	So when you said have I done any 09:48:24
8	laws? 09:45:28	8	analysis of the effect, I'm not sure what 09:48:30
9	MR. CRAMER: For which purpose? 09:45:30	9	you're 09:48:32
10	MR. ISAACSON: For purposes of 09:45:31	10	Q. In your view, the damages in this 09:48:33
11	estimating damages. 09:45:32	11	case would be an anticompetitive effect 09:48:35
12	A. I think the answer is yes. 09:45:34	12	that flowed from the challenged conduct in 09:48:38
13 14	Q. In Paragraph 4 you talk about 09:45:55	13	this case if that conduct were true and if 09:48:40
15	your assignment in this case. "Counsel for 09:46:00 Plaintiffs have asked me to determine." In 09:46:04	14 15	Zuffa had market power, correct? 09:48:42 A. Yes. Yes. 09:48:45
16	(a) it says, "whether the challenged 09:46:08	16	Q. Is there any other 09:48:46
17	conduct is anticompetitive in character and 09:46:11	17	anticompetitive effect that you have 09:48:49
18	thus would have anticompetitive effects if 09:46:13	18	measured or quantified that flows from the 09:48:51
19	engaged in an entity with monopoly or 09:46:16	19	alleged exclusionary conduct in this case 09:48:54
20	monopsony power." 09:46:19	20	assuming that Zuffa had market power? 09:49:02
21	I want to know what you mean by 09:46:21	21	A. Not that I have quantified, no. 09:49:04
22	"anticompetitive character." Is that 09:46:25	22	Q. When you say "anticompetitive in 09:49:05
23	different from saying it's anticompetitive? 09:46:29	23	character" in your report, would it mean 09:49:09
24	A. So I'm not doing a liability 09:46:31	24	the same thing if you just said 09:49:11
25	report here. I was not asked to define 09:46:33	25	"anticompetitive"? 09:49:13

	Page 46		Page 48
1		1	
1	A. Except that I think that by using 09:49:17 the phrase "in character," it underscores 09:49:19	1 2	A. If you're asking about my 09:51:52 empirical work and whether my methodology 09:52:01
2 3	1 /	3	empirical work and whether my methodology 09:52:01 enables me to make that distinction, the 09:52:05
4	the fact that I am not doing a market 09:49:23 analysis. 09:49:24	4	answer is no. 09:52:08
5	•	5	
6	,	6	Q. If Zuffa obtained a dominant 09:52:08 market share through completely legal 09:52:14
7	damages estimate, to what extent does your 09:49:39 report distinguish between any 09:49:42	7	conduct, would your damages method still 09:52:17
8	anticompetitive effects of the alleged 09:49:44	8	find the same damages result? 09:52:23
9	exclusionary conduct as opposed to Zuffa 09:49:47	9	MR. CRAMER: Form. Objection to 09:52:28
10	simply providing a better product or 09:49:51	10	form. 09:52:28
11	service than its competitors? 09:49:53	11	A. Well, look, here is what I would 09:52:34
12	MR. CRAMER: Form. 09:49:58	12	say. If Zuffa believes that the outcomes 09:52:35
13	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, you said 09:50:01	13	that we observe in the UFC have to do with 09:52:37
14	what? Form? 09:50:03	14	their superior management and their 09:52:42
15	MR. CRAMER: I'm sorry, objection 09:50:04	15	superior entrepreneurship and superior 09:52:44
16	to form. Objection to form. I 09:50:05	16	conduct and shepherding of the industry, 09:52:50
17	didn't understand it. If you did, go 09:50:07	17	and that's all that matters, then they 09:52:53
18	ahead and answer it. 09:50:09	18	should do away with the exclusionary 09:52:57
19	A. I was going to ask for 09:50:10	19	clauses in the contracts and look at the 09:52:57
20	clarification. 09:50:11	20	same results. I find that to be a 09:52:57
21	Q. Sure. Does the method that you 09:50:11	21	preposterous proposition. 09:53:01
22	used to estimate damages, does it allow you 09:50:14	22	Q. That's not quite my question. 09:53:01
23	to distinguish between the anticompetitive 09:50:17	23	I'm asking you about the actual empirical 09:53:03
24	effects of the alleged exclusionary conduct 09:50:19	24	methods that you used here. 09:53:06
25	as opposed to Zuffa providing a superior 09:50:23	25	If you assumed that Zuffa has a 09:53:07
	Page 47		Page 49
1	product or service? 09:50:27	1	dominant market share and that it achieved 09:53:12
2	A. That's an ambiguous question and 09:50:39	2	that through providing a superior product 09:53:14
3	has a premises that hasn't been 09:50:42	3	or service, would your empirical method 09:53:16
4	established. Even if we could establish 09:50:44	4	still show the same damages result from 09:53:23
5	that Zuffa is providing a superior product, 09:50:46	5	that monopoly as if that came from illegal 09:53:27
6	I'm not sure what that question means. 09:50:49	6	exclusionary acts? 09:53:36
7	As an economist, I hear that a 09:50:51	7	MR. CRAMER: Objection to form. 09:53:37
8	company is performing superior management 09:50:55	8	Incomplete hypothetical. You can 09:53:39
9	and offering superior service, I think that 09:50:59	9	answer if you understand. 09:53:41
10	revenues are going to go up. Right? 09:51:01	10	A. It's an implausible hypothetical. 09:53:42
11	So is your question asking me or 09:51:05	11	I can't answer it. 09:53:46
12	is it suggesting implicitly that the reason 09:51:08	12	Q. All right. Have you done any 09:53:48
13 14	why there is a low fighter share is because 09:51:11 revenues have gone up so rapidly? Is that 09:51:13	13 14	empirical work you say it's implausible 09:53:50 that Zuffa achieved a dominant market share 09:53:53
15	the meaning of your question? 09:51:16	15	that Zuffa achieved a dominant market share 09:53:53 through providing a superior product or 09:53:56
16	Q. So does your report contain any 09:51:18	16	service. 09:53:58
17	method that allows you to distinguish 09:51:12	17	Does your report contain any 09:53:59
18	between let me start over. 09:51:25	18	analysis as to how Zuffa achieved a 09:54:00
19	Assuming Zuffa has a dominant 09:51:28	19	dominant market share? 09:54:03
20	market share as you have done, does your 09:51:31	20	A. Yes. 09:54:05
21	report include any method that would allow 09:51:34	21	Q. Does it contain any empirical 09:54:05
22	you to distinguish whether they achieve 09:51:37	22	work on that question? 09:54:09
23	that dominant share due to their superior 09:51:40	23	A. If my empirical work you're 09:54:10
24	product and services as opposed to any 09:51:43	24	meaning did I quantify did I have a 09:54:25
25	exclusionary acts? 09:51:48	25	quantified analysis to tease that out? No, 09:54:27



	Page 126		Page 128
1		1	
1 2	anticompetitive. 11:43:08	1 2	, ,
	Q. Correct. 11:43:09	3	on a different Pay-Per-View channel put on 11:45:19
3	A. No. 11:43:10		an event that maybe they think is a more 11:45:12
4	Q. If the UFC has contracts with 11:43:10	4	appealing event. Or Strikeforce has an 11:45:16
5	venues that have a period of exclusivity 11:43:17	5	event at Barclays Center in New York, and 11:45:20
6	with that venue, is that part of the 11:43:23	6	Zuffa puts on an event at Madison Square 11:45:24
7	challenged conduct that you have assumed 11:43:25	7	Garden on the same night so the attendance 11:45:28
8	would reduce competition from which you 11:43:29	8	at the Barclays Center in Brooklyn would be 11:45:30
9	have estimated damages? 11:43:31	9	reduced. 11:45:33
10	A. I think potentially, yes. But I 11:43:32	10	Q. Is counterprogramming one piece 11:45:37
11	would want to look at the contract and the 11:43:35	11	of the challenged conduct from which you 11:45:39
12	timing and the period and the context of 11:43:38	12	have assumed there is reduced competition 11:45:44
13	the contract. 11:43:40	13	based on which you've estimated damages? 11:45:47
14	Q. So in this case, and in your 11:43:41	14	A. It's potentially a very small 11:45:49
15	report, you have not looked at whether the 11:43:44	15	piece of it, but I don't view it as 11:45:51
16	exclusivity provisions in the UFC contracts 11:43:49	16	particularly significant. 11:45:57
17	with venues have any anticompetitive 11:43:52	17	Q. Have you assumed that the 11:45:58
18	aspects? 11:43:54	18	counterprogramming, as you've described it, 11:45:59
19	A. I have read references to it, but 11:43:55	19	would be anticompetitive in nature? 11:46:01
20	I haven't looked at any original documents 11:43:57	20	A. Again, potentially it could be. 11:46:03
21	or done much work on it. 11:43:59	21	Q. I guess I'm confused by your 11:46:05
22	Q. You haven't reached any opinions 11:44:00	22	answer. Because I've asked: Have you 11:46:21
23	in this case as to whether the exclusivity 11:44:03	23	assumed for purposes of your report that 11:46:23
24	provisions in venue contracts have any 11:44:06	24	counterprogramming as you've described it 11:46:25
25	effect of reducing competition or in 11:44:09	25	would be anticompetitive? 11:46:27
	Page 127		Page 129
1	causing damages? 11:44:12	1	A. It's not relevant to the damages 11:46:28
2	A. You're asking me if I reached 11:44:12	2	estimate that I did. 11:46:32
3	conclusions about it? 11:44:15	3	If I might elaborate, and I've 11:46:46
4	Q. Yes. 11:44:17	4	said this several times, but I don't think 11:46:49
5	A. I haven't reached conclusions 11:44:17	5	that any of the individual acts, 11:46:51
6	about it. And, as I said to you just a 11:44:19	6	restrictive acts, exclusionary acts, 11:46:54
7	moment ago, I think this potentially could 11:44:21	7	exclusionary clauses, are things that are 11:46:56
8	be anticompetitive. 11:44:25	8	directly reflected in my damages analysis. 11:46:58
9	Q. I understand you say it's 11:44:25	9	What my damages analysis does is 11:47:01
10	potentially, but you have not reached any 11:44:27	10	it says here is a bunch of here are 11:47:04
11	opinions on 11:44:29	11	exclusionary clauses in the fighter 11:47:07
12	A. Correct. 11:44:30	12	contract, and that those clauses are 11:47:10
13	Q that in this case. 11:44:30	13	necessary to maintain the monopoly control 11:47:13
14	A. Other than that it's potentially 11:44:31	14	that Zuffa has or the monopsony that 11:47:16
15	anticompetitive. That's a conclusion - I 11:44:33	15	Zuffa has in the MMA market. 11:47:19
16	think. 11:44:34	16	And it's because of that 11:47:21
17	Q. If I can ask you to look at 11:44:35	17	monopsony control that fighters have this 11:47:24
18	paragraph are you familiar with the term 11:44:39	18	very low percentage of revenue. And I 11:47:27
19	"Counter programing"? 11:44:49	19	compare that to comparators that have more 11:47:30
20	A. Yes. 11:44:50	20	competition in their labor markets. And, 11:47:35
21	Q. And what's your understanding 11:44:51	21	as a result of that additional competition, 11:47:38
22	what counterprogramming would be in this 11:44:52	22	they have higher labor shares. 11:47:40
23	context? 11:44:53	23	MR. CRAMER: Bill, once you 11:47:59
24	A. Strikeforce has an event on 11:44:54	24	finish this line of questioning, can 11:47:59
25	Pay-Per-View and Zuffa doesn't want it to 11:44:58	25	we take a break? We've been going 11:48:04

	Page 130		Page 132
1	for over an hour and it's gotten hot 11:48:06	1	That also is maybe a belief of 12:45:05
2	in here again. 11:48:07	2	yours, but it's not an opinion that's 12:45:07
3	MR. ISAACSON: We should take a 11:48:08	3	reached in your report, correct? 12:45:08
4	break now. 11:48:08	4	A. Yes. 12:45:10
5	MR. CRAMER: Okay, that's fine. 11:48:09	5	Q. And then your method of damages 12:45:11
6	THE WITNESS: So are we taking a 11:48:09	6	you explain, as you explained before, is 12:45:22
7	normal five-minute break or are we 11:48:11	7	that you compare the MMA market to more 12:45:25
8	going for a half-an-hour lunch? 11:48:11	8	competitive labor markets. And a result of 12:45:29
9	MR. CRAMER: Let's go off the 11:48:11	9	that competition in those other labor 12:45:32
10	record. 11:48:14	10	markets, you say they have higher labor 12:45:36
11	VIDEO TECHNICIAN: 11:47. Off 11:48:14	11	shares of revenue. By that you mean the 12:45:38
12	the record 11:58:46	12	percentage of total revenue that goes to 12:45:40
13		13	labor; is that correct? 12:45:43
14		14	MR. CRAMER: Objection to form. 12:45:45
15		15	Compound. 12:45:46
16		16	A. Yes. 12:45:47
17		17	Q. And you have reached an opinion 12:45:47
18		18	on the aggregate amount of damages assuming 12:45:58
19		19	liability in this case 12:46:01
20		20	A. Can I interrupt you? Sorry. Is 12:46:02
21		21	that okay? 12:46:04
22		22	Q. Yes. 12:46:05
23		23	A. No, I just want to I want to 12:46:05
24		24	clarify when you said "labor," there are 12:46:06
25		25	the athletes who are laborers, and then 12:46:09
	Page 131		Page 133
1	AFTERNOON SESSION 11:58:46	1	there are executives and administrators who 12:46:12
2	(Whereupon the deposition was 11:58:46	2	are laborers also. And so I was talking 12:46:15
3	resumed at 12:43 p.m.; appearances 11:58:46	3	about the athlete component of labor. 12:46:18
4	same as noted.) 12:44:04	4	Sorry for interrupting, sir. 12:46:20
5	VIDEO TECHNICIAN: We're back on 12:44:04	5	Q. Okay. And I understood that, but 12:46:22
6	the record at 12:43 p.m. 12:44:10	6	thank you. 12:46:24
7	BY MR. ISAACSON: 12:44:13	7	When you talk about Zuffa's 12:46:24
8	Q. Before our break, Professor, you 12:44:13	8	control in the market, you used the term 12:46:26
9	resummarized your damages model. And I 12:44:17	9	"monopsony." In your report, you referred 12:46:29
10	want to make sure I understand it. 12:44:22	10	to "monopsony" and "monopoly." 12:46:32
11	One thing you said was there are 12:44:25	11	Are you assuming for purposes of 12:46:35
12	exclusionary contracts or provisions in the 12:44:30	12	estimating damages, that Zuffa had both 12:46:37
13	fighter contracts and those clauses are 12:44:32	13	monopsony and monopoly control of the MMA 12:46:39
14	necessary to maintain the control that 12:44:34	14	market? 12:46:44
15	Zuffa has in the MMA market. 12:44:35	15	A. Yes. 12:46:44
16	I am correct, though, that the 12:44:38	16	Q. And you have not done any damages 12:46:44
17	conclusion that those clauses are necessary 12:44:43	17	estimate where you assume that Zuffa had 12:46:52
18	to maintain Zuffa's control over the MMA 12:44:45	18	either monopsony control or monopoly 12:46:54
19	market, that may be a belief of yours, but 12:44:48	19	control, but only one. I didn't say that 12:46:59
20	that's not an opinion that you've reached 12:44:51	20	very well, but I think you get the point. 12:47:03
21	in your report? 12:44:54	21	I'll say it again. 12:47:06
22	A. It's not in my expert opinion. 12:44:55	22	A. I didn't make any separate 12:47:07
23	Q. And you also said that because of 12:44:56	23	estimates at all. I made one estimate. 12:47:08
24	this monopsony, fighters have this very low 12:44:59	24 25	There is one bout damages estimate for the 12:47:10 condition that the athletes in Zufra's 12:47:13
25	percentage of revenue. 12:45:03	123	condition that the atmetes in Zuira's 12:47:13




	Page 134		Page 136
1	labor market experience. 12:47:19	1	to 12:49:53
2	Q. And because you have assumed that 12:47:22	2	THE WITNESS: Okay. 12:49:53
3	Zuffa has monopsony and monopoly control 12:47:26	3	MR. CRAMER: let him finish. 12:49:54
4	over the MMA market, that market is less 12:47:29	4	THE WITNESS: Sorry. 12:49:55
5	competitive. And when you compare it to 12:47:32	5	Q. You went about estimating damages 12:49:55
6	more competitive labor markets, referring 12:47:34	6	by doing a simple comparison between sports 12:49:56
7	to athletes or fighters, then you are able 12:47:37	7	leagues with more competition in the labor 12:49:59
8	to estimate damages by that comparison; is 12:47:39	8	market and with, in your opinion, Zuffa 12:50:01
9	that correct? 12:47:41	9	with less competition? 12:50:03
10	MR. CRAMER: Objection to form. 12:47:41	10	MR. CRAMER: Objection to form. 12:50:04
11	A. That's correct. 12:47:46	11	Objection to the use of the term 12:50:05
12	Q. All right. And because you are 12:47:47	12	"simple." Objection to the 12:50:06
13	making assumptions about whether there was 12:47:50	13	characterization. 12:50:08
14	a monopsony or a monopoly or whether there 12:47:54	14	
15	were exclusionary acts, you are not 12:47:58	15	A. And yes, with the qualification 12:50:09 that you only talked about team sports. 12:50:11
16	reaching any expert opinions in your report 12:48:02	16	And one of the comparators is boxing. 12:50:13
17	about whether Zuffa caused the aggregate 12:48:05	17	Q. The model that you have used, 12:50:27
18	damages that you have estimated; is that 12:48:10	18	when I say "a simple comparison," means you 12:50:30
19	correct? 12:48:12	19	have not tried to inject any potential 12:50:33
20	A. I'm not making an assumption 12:48:12	20	alternative variables or explanations that 12:50:35
21	about it? 12:48:16	21	might explain the differences between the 12:50:36
22	Q. No. I think I got to make sure I 12:48:17	22	percentages of revenues other than what you 12:50:39
23	speak up because of the background noise. 12:48:19	23	have assumed are anticompetitive acts; is 12:50:41
24	You were making assumptions about 12:48:21	24	that correct? 12:50:43
25	whether there was a monopsony or monopoly 12:48:24	25	MR. CRAMER: Objection to form. 12:50:43
	Page 135		Page 137
1	and about whether there was an exclusionary 12:48:28	1	A. I don't think that's quite right, 12:50:49
2	act. Because of that, you are not reaching 12:48:28	2	although I think I understand what you 12:50:51
3	any expert opinions in your report about 12:48:30	3	mean. Because I am making a comparison to 12:50:53
4	whether Zuffa caused the aggregate damages 12:48:31	4	sports that, sometimes team sports, 12:50:58
5	that you have estimated; is that correct? 12:48:33	5	sometimes boxing, that do have restraints 12:51:02
6	A. It's correct. Let me clarify it, 12:48:38	6	on their labor markets. They're not 12:51:06
7	if I might; that I am not reaching expert 12:48:43	7	totally free labor markets. 12:51:08
8	opinions on the matters that you described. 12:48:46	8	So what I do say is that when I 12:51:10
9	I am asserting that the 12:48:49	9	compare what Zuffa would be in a 12:51:12
10	evidentiary basis in the record suggests to 12:48:53	10	competitive environment to these sports 12:51:14
11	me that monopsony and monopoly did prevail 12:48:57	11	that are not fully competitive 12:51:19
12	and that Zuffa's corresponding behavior is 12:49:03	12	environments, that it ends up producing a 12:51:20
13	the cause. But I am not making an expert 12:49:07	13	conservative estimate of the difference 12:51:22
14	opinion on that. 12:49:10	14	that Zuffa fighters would earn in the 12:51:33
15	Q. Now, in terms of how you went 12:49:12	15	but-for world. 12:51:35
16	about estimating aggregate damages, you are 12:49:25	16	Q. And with the understanding that 12:51:38
17	doing a simple comparison between sports 12:49:31	17	you say your estimate is conservative, when 12:51:40
18	leagues with more competition and Zuffa 12:49:37	18	you compare Zuffa to the other sports, you 12:51:42
19	with less competition as you 12:49:40	19	do not try to control for or take into 12:51:48
20	A. There is more competition in the 12:49:44	20	account of any other variables that may 12:51:51
21	labor market. 12:49:45	21	explain the differences in compensation to 12:51:54
22	Q. All right. Fair. 12:49:46	22	labor in terms of percentage between those 12:51:56
23	A. In the case of the sports league. 12:49:48	23	sports; is that correct? 12:51:59
24	MR. CRAMER: I don't think he was 12:49:50	24	MR. CRAMER: Asked and answered. 12:51:59
25	done with the question, so you have 12:49:51	25	I think he just answered that 12:52:00

	Page 194		Page 196
1	-	1	competitive and more responsive and more 01:49:45
2	Q. My question was about management 01:47:49 practices. 01:47:51	2	productive policies can follow from that. 01:49:48
3	A. Yes. So management practices 01:47:51	3	Q. All right. So as part of your 01:49:50
4	have to do with the wage rate that's paid 01:47:53	4	report, have you done any investigation of 01:49:52
5	their employees, doesn't it? 01:47:56	5	what Zuffa is doing as management 01:49:55
6	Q. I understand that you say when 01:47:57	6	practices, either with regards to analytics 01:49:59
7	you say that "each of the teams adapted to 01:48:00	7	•
	• •	8	or any other type of management? 01:50:01 A. I've seen no evidence that 01:50:03
8	higher player costs by employing more 01:48:06		
9	effective management practices" 01:48:08	9	they're doing analytics. I've read quite a 01:50:05
10	A. Yes. 01:48:10	10	bit about how workers are treated in a 01:50:08
11	Q you're not just is the more 01:48:10	11	variety of ways and circumstances. I've 01:50:10
12	effective management practice you're 01:48:11	12	read about the absence of medical care. 01:50:13
13	talking about higher pay? 01:48:13	13	I've read about the absence of paying them 01:50:18
14	A. No. I mean, but you 01:48:14	14	for the cost of their gym and their 01:50:26
15	Q. So are there any 01:48:15	15	training. 01:50:28
16	A any interest after Zuffa. 01:48:16	16	So, yes, I have read about it and 01:50:29
17	Q. Have you done any study or any 01:48:18	17	I have thought about it. 01:50:32
18	investigation of any management practices 01:48:20	18	Q. All right. So let me point out 01:50:32
19 20	by Zuffa that could be more effective? 01:48:22	19	to you, for example, you say in 01:50:34
21	MR. CRAMER: Other than the one 01:48:26	20 21	Paragraph 80, you again discuss this topic. 01:50:38 You talk about in the second sentence "As 01:51:06
22	he just identified. 01:48:27	22	
23	Q. Other than paying fighters more. 01:48:28	23	salaries rose, and rose rapidly, owners 01:51:11
24	A. Covering their healthcare, making 01:48:35	24	began to treat their clubs as true 01:51:14
25	sure that they have good diets, paying for 01:48:39 their gymnasiums, paying for their travel 01:48:44	25	businesses, engaging in advertising, 01:51:15 marketing, planning, improved community 01:51:17
23		23	
	Page 195		Page 197
1	when they're not coming to a bout, using 01:48:48	1	relations, facility upgrades, strategic 01:51:19
2	analytic techniques. I wrote a whole book 01:48:50	2	pricing policies, rationalized scouting and 01:51:22
3	about labor management practices in 01:48:54	3	player evaluation," and so on. 01:51:25
4	baseball. It's called Sabermetrics. 01:48:56	4	Have you done any investigation 01:51:28
5	It explains how baseball began to 01:49:00	5	of any of those topics as they're handled 01:51:29
6	use other methods of analysis to figure out 01:49:01	6	at the UFC, advertising, marketing, 01:51:32
7	how productive players were because players 01:49:03	7	planning, community relations, facility 01:51:35
8	became more and more expensive. And when 01:49:06	8	upgrades, strategic pricing policies, 01:51:40
9	you're playing \$15 million for a player who 01:49:08	9	scouting and player evaluation? 01:51:40
10	doesn't pan out, you want to try to figure 01:49:11	10	MR. CRAMER: Other than what he 01:51:42
11	that out. You want to learn more about the 01:49:12	11	just testified to. 01:51:43
12	player's background and training and 01:49:15	12	MR. ISAACSON: I don't think he 01:51:44
13	different physical characteristics that he 01:49:17	13	testified to any of that. 01:51:45
14	has on the field or the trajectory of the 01:49:20	14	A. I think that I did testify to it. 01:51:46
15	speed of the ball off the bat has, and so 01:49:24	15	I've read an inordinate number of documents 01:51:47
16	on. 01:49:27	16	in this case from depositions, to reports, 01:51:51
17	So that there are presumably 01:49:27	17	to the e-mails, to analyses. On the basis 01:51:53
18	analytics that can as Zuffa fighters get 01:49:28	18	of all of that, I've come to certain 01:51:59
19	paid more, they're going to be more careful 01:49:29	19	opinions about these areas that you're 01:52:04
20	about these are expensive assets that we 01:49:32	20	mentioning. 01:52:05
21	have. We want to make sure they're in good 01:49:35	21	Q. And do you have opinions about 01:52:06
22 23	shape. We want to make sure if we give 01:49:37 them a particular bout, that that's the 01:49:39	22 23	whether the UFC's advertising has been 01:52:09
24	them a particular bout, that that's the 01:49:39 bout that they ought to have. 01:49:41	24	deficient? 01:52:12 A. I haven't studied that in detail. 01:52:19
25	• •	25	
20	So the whole slew of more 01:49:42	20	I think that that's one area where I 01:52:21

Page 198 1 probably did not look for a deficiency, but 01:52:22 2 I haven't studied it in detail. 01:52:25 1 A. I haven't done m 2 that, no.	Page 200
	. 1 . 0 . 01.54.20
2 I haven't studied it in detail. 01:52:25 2 that, no.	· ·
	01:54:41
	ethods an economist 01:54:41
	y to determine whether 01:54:43
5 Q. What about community relations? 01:52:30 5 a business has the ability	• •
6 A. Well, again, I haven't studied 01:52:33 6 significantly?	01:54:47
	Objection to form. 01:54:51
8 comments that have been made by Dana White 01:52:37 8 A. More typically, 6	
9 and others that suggest to me that 01:52:39 9 not be doing studies of p	1
community relations could be improved. 01:52:41 10 businesses' growth potential	
Q. What about facility upgrades? 01:52:42 11 extent that an economis	
12 A. They rent their facilities, as 01:52:45 12 such a study, they would	
far as I know. Although, I guess they are 01:52:48 13 of growth in the recent p	
14 now building a gymnasium. But as far as I 01:52:50 14 They would proba	
know, they rent their facilities. I don't 01:52:53 15 studies with consumers.	
	ey would probably look 01:55:29
Q. Are you aware of any current 01:52:57 17 at macroeconomic cond	*
	f it was an industry 01:55:36
A. As I just mentioned, I'm aware 01:53:03 19 within a particular state.	
	terest rates and 01:55:40
21 it's and it's at least touted to be a 01:53:09 21 see whether the interest	
very well equipped and modern facility, but 01:53:13 22 was favorable for loan c	-
23 that's all that I know about it. 01:53:15 23 applied. So those are so	
Q. Do you know the status of that 01:53:16 24 that would be considere	
25 facility? 01:53:18 25 Q. Have you done a	any of those things 01:55:52
Page 199	Page 201
1 A. No. 01:53:19 1 in this case to determine	ne the capacity of 01:55:54
2 Q. Do you know anything about the 01:53:19 2 either Zuffa or MMA to	o expand? 01:55:58
3 quality of that facility? 01:53:20 3 A. No.	01:56:00
4 A. No. 01:53:21 4 Q. Can I ask you to	o look at 01:56:00
5 Q. What about strategic pricing 01:53:21 5 Paragraph 25 footnote 5	54 and footnote 01:56:09
6 policies by the UFC, do you have any 01:53:26 6 54.	01:56:17
7 criticism of whether they've engaged in 01:53:28 7 A. Are we leaving	the subject of 01:56:17
8 inappropriate strategic pricing policy? 01:53:31 8 management?	01:56:19
9 A. I haven't seen reference to 01:53:33 9 Q. Yes.	01:56:20
	s hoping I get to 01:56:21
pricing market studies. So I'm not sure if 01:53:42 11 say one other thing.	01:56:24
· ·	Are you going to 01:56:29
Q. What about scouting and player 01:53:46 13 allow him to say that	at other thing? 01:56:29
	N: I'm going to let 01:56:31
scouting and evaluation of fighters by the 01:53:49 15 you ask your own q	
	Okay. We'll save it 01:56:34
A. Well, I have read depositions by 01:53:53 17 for rebuttal.	01:56:36
1 1 /	N: I'm under time 01:56:37
19 is responsible for doing scouting and 01:54:00 19 limits. So the free-f	form process 01:56:38
	1. 01:56:42
20 signing talent. And I've read comments 01:54:02 20 doesn't suit me well	
signing talent. And I've read comments 01:54:02 20 doesn't suit me well about it, but I have not subjected that to 01:54:07 21 MR. CRAMER:	Was there a question 01:56:43
signing talent. And I've read comments 01:54:02 20 doesn't suit me well about it, but I have not subjected that to 01:54:07 21 MR. CRAMER: systematic study. 01:54:10 22 that was on the table	Was there a question 01:56:43 le that you felt 01:56:44
signing talent. And I've read comments 01:54:02 20 doesn't suit me well about it, but I have not subjected that to 01:54:07 21 MR. CRAMER: systematic study. 01:54:10 22 that was on the table Q. Have you done any study of the 01:54:12 23 was incompletely at	Was there a question 01:56:43 le that you felt 01:56:44 unswered? I just 01:56:45
signing talent. And I've read comments 01:54:02 20 doesn't suit me well about it, but I have not subjected that to 01:54:07 21 MR. CRAMER: systematic study. 01:54:10 22 that was on the table Q. Have you done any study of the 01:54:12 23 was incompletely at potential additional demand for MMA events? 01:54:25 24 want to know wheth	Was there a question 01:56:43 le that you felt 01:56:44 unswered? I just 01:56:45

	Page 202		Page 204
1	the end of the deposition on your 01:56:49	1	Q. Well, that's exact well. 01:58:28
2	time. 01:56:51	2	And you say "Under the modern 01:58:33
3	MR. CRAMER: Okay. That's fair. 01:56:51	3	system, studios renegotiate contracts for 01:58:35
4	BY MR. ISAACSON: 01:57:03	4	every new project"; is that right? 01:58:38
5	Q. So we've talked extensively about 01:57:03	5	A. Does it say that in the footnote? 01:58:40
6	the comparisons to baseball, football, 01:57:06	6	Q. I believe 01:58:44
7	hockey and basketball. In Paragraph 25 you 01:57:08	7	A. Can I look at the footnote? 01:58:44
8	say, "The parallels also extend to the 01:57:11	8	Q. You have it right in front of 01:58:46
9	entertainment industry outside of 01:57:15	9	you. 01:58:47
10	professional sports." 01:57:17	10	A. Well, I need to know what page 01:58:48
11	I just want to make sure I 01:57:18	11	we're looking at. 01:58:51
12	understand what you have to say in this 01:57:20	12	Q. Page 18. 01:58:52
13	area. There are parallels to what you say 01:57:21	13	A. (Document review.) Okay. It does 01:59:20
14	are the assumed anticompetitive conduct by 01:57:24	14	say that. Yup. 01:59:23
15	Zuffa and what has happened in the 01:57:28	15	Q. And are there any contracts in 01:59:24
16	entertainment industry in the past; is that 01:57:30	16	this case that you've identified that 01:59:26
17	correct? 01:57:33	17	extend beyond seven calendar years? 01:59:28
18	A. There are parallels you're 01:57:33	18	MR. CRAMER: Objection to form. 01:59:33
19	saying? 01:57:35	19	A. In the contract itself you're 01:59:34
20	Q. Yes. 01:57:35	20	saying as opposed to the 01:59:36
21	A. Yes. 01:57:36	21	Q. Let's start with the contract 01:59:38
22	Q. And when you say "the 01:57:36	22	itself. 01:59:40
23	entertainment industry," are you talking 01:57:38	23	A. Not that I know of. The longest 01:59:40
24	about movies? Television? Both? 01:57:40	24 25	one I think I saw was three or four years. 01:59:43
25	A. Movies. 01:57:43	25	Q. And based on the yardsticks 01:59:45
	Page 203		Page 205
1	Q. And as I understand it, 01:57:43		you've applied, you would expect that 01:59:54
2	historically at some point movie actors 01:57:45		
3	were not free agents due to a studio system 01:57:49	3	actors in a movie; is that right? 02:00:01
4	which employed long-term exclusive 01:57:53	4	A. Not necessarily. 02:00:14
5	contracts? 01:57:54	5	Q. Why? 02:00:19
6	A. Yes. 01:57:55		
7 8	0 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	6	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20
	Q. And the long-term exclusive 01:57:55	7	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20 about the cost structure of moviemaking. 02:00:22
	contracts had a number of extension 01:57:57	7 8	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20 about the cost structure of moviemaking. 02:00:22 Q. What is it about the cost 02:00:27
9	contracts had a number of extension 01:57:57 provisions? 01:57:58	7 8 9	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20 about the cost structure of moviemaking. 02:00:22 Q. What is it about the cost 02:00:27 structure that would cause you to say that 02:00:29
9 10	contracts had a number of extension 01:57:57 provisions? 01:57:58 A. Yes. 01:57:59	7 8 9 10	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20 about the cost structure of moviemaking. 02:00:22 Q. What is it about the cost 02:00:27 structure that would cause you to say that 02:00:29 something less than 50 percent of revenues 02:00:31
9 10 11	contracts had a number of extension 01:57:57 provisions? 01:57:58 A. Yes. 01:57:59 Q. And the studio system eventually 01:57:59	7 8 9 10 11	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20 about the cost structure of moviemaking. 02:00:22 Q. What is it about the cost 02:00:27 structure that would cause you to say that 02:00:29 something less than 50 percent of revenues 02:00:31 should go to the movie actors? 02:00:33
9 10 11 12	contracts had a number of extension 01:57:57 provisions? 01:57:58 A. Yes. 01:57:59 Q. And the studio system eventually 01:57:59 ended; is that right? 01:58:03	7 8 9 10 11 12	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20 about the cost structure of moviemaking. 02:00:22 Q. What is it about the cost 02:00:27 structure that would cause you to say that 02:00:29 something less than 50 percent of revenues 02:00:31 should go to the movie actors? 02:00:33 A. I'm just saying that I would want 02:00:36
9 10 11 12 13	contracts had a number of extension 01:57:57 provisions? 01:57:58 A. Yes. 01:57:59 Q. And the studio system eventually 01:57:59 ended; is that right? 01:58:03 A. Yes. 01:58:04	7 8 9 10 11 12 13	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20 about the cost structure of moviemaking. 02:00:22 Q. What is it about the cost 02:00:27 structure that would cause you to say that 02:00:29 something less than 50 percent of revenues 02:00:31 should go to the movie actors? 02:00:33 A. I'm just saying that I would want 02:00:36 to study it. I know a great deal about 02:00:38
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	contracts had a number of extension 01:57:57 provisions? 01:57:58 A. Yes. 01:57:59 Q. And the studio system eventually 01:57:59 ended; is that right? 01:58:03 A. Yes. 01:58:04 Q. And it ended when a court in 01:58:04 California held that personal service 01:58:08 contracts can't extend beyond seven 01:58:10 calendar years. 01:58:12 A. That's correct. 01:58:13	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20 about the cost structure of moviemaking. 02:00:22 Q. What is it about the cost 02:00:27 structure that would cause you to say that 02:00:29 something less than 50 percent of revenues 02:00:31 should go to the movie actors? 02:00:33 A. I'm just saying that I would want 02:00:36 to study it. I know a great deal about 02:00:38 professional sports, and I was comfortable 02:00:41 in making that comparison. And before I'd 02:00:44 be making such a comparison with the movie 02:00:47 business, I'd want to study it. 02:00:49 Q. What about the cost that you 02:00:51
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	contracts had a number of extension 01:57:57 provisions? 01:57:58 A. Yes. 01:57:59 Q. And the studio system eventually 01:57:59 ended; is that right? 01:58:03 A. Yes. 01:58:04 Q. And it ended when a court in 01:58:04 California held that personal service 01:58:08 contracts can't extend beyond seven 01:58:10 calendar years. 01:58:12 A. That's correct. 01:58:13 Q. And once the Court held that a 01:58:14 personal service contract could not extend 01:58:18 studio system and essentially created free 01:58:21 agency. 01:58:26	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20 about the cost structure of moviemaking. 02:00:22 Q. What is it about the cost 02:00:27 structure that would cause you to say that 02:00:29 something less than 50 percent of revenues 02:00:31 should go to the movie actors? 02:00:33 A. I'm just saying that I would want 02:00:36 to study it. I know a great deal about 02:00:38 professional sports, and I was comfortable 02:00:41 in making that comparison. And before I'd 02:00:44 be making such a comparison with the movie 02:00:47 business, I'd want to study it. 02:00:49 Q. What about the cost that you 02:00:51 would be looking at to determine why that 02:00:53 comparison would or would not be valid? 02:00:56 MR. CRAMER: Asked and answered. 02:00:59 He said he wanted to study it. 02:01:00 Q. That's what I'm saying. He 02:01:02
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	contracts had a number of extension 01:57:57 provisions? 01:57:58 A. Yes. 01:57:59 Q. And the studio system eventually 01:57:59 ended; is that right? 01:58:03 A. Yes. 01:58:04 Q. And it ended when a court in 01:58:04 California held that personal service 01:58:08 contracts can't extend beyond seven 01:58:10 calendar years. 01:58:12 A. That's correct. 01:58:13 Q. And once the Court held that a 01:58:14 personal service contract could not extend 01:58:16 beyond seven calendar years, that ended the 01:58:18 studio system and essentially created free 01:58:21	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. Because I want to study more 02:00:20 about the cost structure of moviemaking. 02:00:22 Q. What is it about the cost 02:00:27 structure that would cause you to say that 02:00:29 something less than 50 percent of revenues 02:00:31 should go to the movie actors? 02:00:33 A. I'm just saying that I would want 02:00:36 to study it. I know a great deal about 02:00:38 professional sports, and I was comfortable 02:00:41 in making that comparison. And before I'd 02:00:44 be making such a comparison with the movie 02:00:47 business, I'd want to study it. 02:00:49 Q. What about the cost that you 02:00:51 would be looking at to determine why that 02:00:53 comparison would or would not be valid? 02:00:59 He said he wanted to study it. 02:01:00



	Page 258	
1	CERTIFICATE	
2		
3 4	COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, SS.	
5	I, MaryJo O'Connor, a Notary Public	
6	in and for the Commonwealth of	
7	Massachusetts, do hereby certify:	
8	That ANDREW ZIMBALIST, Ph.D., the	
9	witness whose testimony is hereinbefore set	
10 11	forth, was duly sworn by me and that such	
12	testimony is a true and accurate record of my stenotype notes taken in the foregoing	
13	matter to the best of my knowledge, skill	
14	and ability.	
15	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto	
16	set my hand and Notarial Seal this 2nd day of October 2017.	
17 18	of October 2017.	
19		
20	MARYJO O'CONNOR, RMR/CSR	
0.1	Notary Public	
21 22		
22	My Commission expires:	
23	September 28, 2018	
24		
25		

